Iniustitia, iniuria (injustice and harm)
Judge Rakoff is in the Southern District of New York.
His views pertain to the prosecution of the perpetrators of the frauds that led to the 2008 financial crisis, but there are stunning parallels to the Toyota case.
Here are some applicable excerpts from his excellent article:
"The [DOJ] position has been to excuse their failure to prosecute high-level individuals for fraud in connection with the financial crisis on one or more of three grounds:
First, they have argued that proving fraudulent intent on the part of the high-level management of the banks and companies involved has been difficult. It is undoubtedly true that the ranks of top management were several levels removed from those who were putting together the collateralized debt obligations and other securities offerings that were based on dubious mortgages; and the people generating the mortgages themselves were often at other companies and thus even further removed."
"But what I do find surprising is that the Department of Justice should view the proving of intent as so difficult in this case. Who, for example, was generating the so-called “suspicious activity reports” of mortgage fraud that, as mentioned, increased so hugely in the years leading up to the crisis? Why, the banks themselves. A top-level banker, one might argue, confronted with growing evidence from his own and other banks that mortgage fraud was increasing, might have inquired why his bank’s mortgage-based securities continued to receive AAA ratings. And if, despite these and other reports of suspicious activity, the executive failed to make such inquiries, might it be because he did not want to know what such inquiries would reveal?
This, of course, is what is known in the law as “willful blindness” or “conscious disregard.” It is a well-established basis on which federal prosecutors have asked juries to infer intent, including in cases involving complexities, such as accounting rules, at least as esoteric as those involved in the events leading up to the financial crisis. And while some federal courts have occasionally expressed qualifications about the use of the willful blindness approach to prove intent, the Supreme Court has consistently approved it. As that Court stated most recently in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. (2011):
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.
Thus, the department’s claim that proving intent in the financial crisis is particularly difficult may strike some as doubtful."
Next
"The Department of Justice has sometimes argued that it might be difficult to prove reliance."
"The Department of Justice has sometimes argued that it might be difficult to prove reliance."
[But] "In actuality, in a criminal fraud case the government is never required to prove—ever—that one party to a transaction relied on the word of another."
"The law says that society is harmed when a seller purposely lies about a material fact, even if the immediate purchaser does not rely on that particular fact, because such misrepresentations create problems for the market as a whole."
"The department has sometimes [given a reason] for not bringing these prosecutions is that to do so would itself harm the economy. "
"To a federal judge, who takes an oath to apply the law equally to rich and to poor, this excuse—sometimes labeled the “too big to jail” excuse—is disturbing, frankly, in what it says about the department’s apparent disregard for equality under the law." and
"If we are talking about prosecuting individuals, the excuse becomes entirely irrelevant; for no one that I know of has ever contended that a big financial institution would collapse if one or more of its high-level executives were prosecuted, as opposed to the institution itself."
Some other reasons:
"First, the prosecutors had other priorities."
and
and
"The government, writ large, had a part in creating the conditions that encouraged the approval of dubious mortgages." [-> this might also be said about unsafe auto electronics]
"It was the government, pretty much across the board, that acquiesced in the ever-greater tendency not to require meaningful documentation" of mortgage qualifications" [yup, also -> safety defects]
"[Such] mortages later became known as 'liars’ loans.'” [so, duh, let's mention NHTSA here.]
"what I am suggesting is that the government was deeply involved, from beginning to end, in helping create the conditions that could lead to such fraud, and that this would give a prudent prosecutor pause in deciding whether to indict a CEO who might, with some justice, claim that he was only doing what he fairly believed the government wanted him to do."
Judge Rakoff's most important point is here, and it is the most relevant to Toyota, because THIS COMPANY PROSECUTION APPROACH IS WHAT HAPPENED. The law firm involved was Debevoise & Plimpton, and I worked for them.
The article is well worth reading in its entirety.
"It was the government, pretty much across the board, that acquiesced in the ever-greater tendency not to require meaningful documentation" of mortgage qualifications" [yup, also -> safety defects]
"[Such] mortages later became known as 'liars’ loans.'” [so, duh, let's mention NHTSA here.]
"what I am suggesting is that the government was deeply involved, from beginning to end, in helping create the conditions that could lead to such fraud, and that this would give a prudent prosecutor pause in deciding whether to indict a CEO who might, with some justice, claim that he was only doing what he fairly believed the government wanted him to do."
Judge Rakoff's most important point is here, and it is the most relevant to Toyota, because THIS COMPANY PROSECUTION APPROACH IS WHAT HAPPENED. The law firm involved was Debevoise & Plimpton, and I worked for them.
"If you are a prosecutor attempting to discover the individuals responsible for an apparent financial fraud, you go about your business in much the same way you go after mobsters or drug kingpins: you start at the bottom and, over many months or years, slowly work your way up. Specifically, you start by “flipping” some lower- or mid-level participant in the fraud who you can show was directly responsible for making one or more false material misrepresentations but who is willing to cooperate, and maybe even “wear a wire”—i.e., secretly record his colleagues—in order to reduce his sentence. With his help, and aided by the substantial prison penalties now available in white-collar cases, you go up the ladder.
But if your priority is prosecuting the company, a different scenario takes place. Early in the investigation, you invite in counsel to the company and explain to him or her why you suspect fraud. He or she responds by assuring you that the company wants to cooperate and do the right thing, and to that end the company has hired a former assistant US attorney, now a partner at a respected law firm, to do an internal investigation. The company’s counsel asks you to defer your investigation until the company’s own internal investigation is completed, on the condition that the company will share its results with you. In order to save time and resources, you agree.
Six months later the company’s counsel returns, with a detailed report showing that mistakes were made but that the company is now intent on correcting them. You and the company then agree that the company will enter into a deferred prosecution agreement that couples some immediate fines with the imposition of expensive but internal prophylactic measures. For all practical purposes the case is now over. You are happy because you believe that you have helped prevent future crimes; the company is happy because it has avoided a devastating indictment; and perhaps the happiest of all are the executives, or former executives, who actually committed the underlying misconduct, for they are left untouched.
I suggest that this is not the best way to proceed."
The article is well worth reading in its entirety.