Monday, November 21, 2016

Toyota Corolla crashes into apartment, kills man





Reporter Annie Andrews indicates the authorities will be looking at the forensic data from the vehicle’s computer.  It’s pretty apparent from all of the articles, the driver and passenger (no identification or age information provided) may have indicated to the police their vehicle might have malfunctioned in some way.  All indicate drugs and alcohol were not involved, were not charged, and the police will provide additional details concerning this incident next week.
Apartment building crash
(Bryson Square Apartments)
Location:  10800 Block of Southeast 240th Place, Kent, Washington 
Date:  November 19, 2016  (Saturday night just before 9:00 pm)
Vehicle:  Toyota Corolla (could read the letters across the trunk of the vehicle after enlarging one of the better photos .
=================================================
Car crashes through Kent apartment, kills
man lying in bed
by KOMO Staff
Saturday, November 19th 2016
(with 19 photos)  (Toyota Corolla) 
=================================================
Man killed after car crashes into Kent apartment
KING
10:15 PM. PST November 19, 2016
=================================================
Kent man dies after car drives into his
apartment
NOVEMBER 19, 2016 9:54 PM
BY MELISSA SANTOS
(with three pictures)
=================================================
 2000 – 2007 TOYOTA COROLLA Vehicle Speed Control Problems  (as of: 19 Nov 2016)
=================================================
Car crashes into Kent apartment killing
sleeping man inside
POSTED 8:45 PM, NOVEMBER 19, 2016
UPDATED AT 10:31PM, NOVEMBER 19, 2016
BY Q13 NEWS STAFF
(with 2:37 min video segment – Annie Andrews)
(Forensic data mentioned: 1:32 – 1:45 min marks)
=================================================
Car crashes into Kent apartment killing
sleeping man inside
POSTED 8:45 PM, NOVEMBER 19, 2016
UPDATED AT 10:31PM, NOVEMBER 19, 2016
BY Q13 NEWS STAFF
---------------------2:37 min video segment -------------------
KENT, Wash. -- A man was killed Saturday night when a car crashed into a
Kent apartment building in the 10800 block of southeast 240th Place.
Kent police say two people were in the car when it went through the home
fatality striking a man who was asleep in his bed. The driver and the
passenger were not injured.
The exact cause of the crash is under investigation. Authorities say they do
not believe drugs or alcohol played a part.
Q13's Annie Andrews spoke with the victim's daughter who was home at
the time of the crash. She said her father was war veteran who was a
devout Mormon.
The identity of the victim and the cause of death will be determined by the
Medical Examiner.
We'll update this story when more information becomes available.
Copyright © 2016, KCPQ • A Tribune Broadcasting Station
=================================================

Friday, October 21, 2016

DENSO document

https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BxYkSkVbATRSeHhHOWk2eURfc1U

Why doesn't TOYOTA or its key supplier Denso want anyone to see this? They should be proud of their great engineering that they say makes their cars so "Safe."

Wednesday, September 21, 2016

Toyota's first pathetic attempt at censorship of posted documents


...this just in...

somehow or other, twitter has been convinced to post a warning notice to readers who follow tweeted links to this blog and to one other blog that attempts to expose Toyota's misdeeds.

In a stupendous ironic twist, the links to this blog and the other blog are labelled by twitter as "unsafe." (!!!!!)

LOL or read and weep? Unsafe for who? >>IMHO, for Toyota and no one else. there is nothing malicious going on here. The blog may pose a little threat of exposing Toyota's fraud. Byproduct--it provides a little pocket change for the "gladiator" attorneys whose jobs consist of concealing dirty secrets about unsafe...unsafe products from the public.

Text of warning:

Warning: This link may be unsafe
The link you are trying to access has been identified by Twitter or our partners as being potentially harmful or associated with a violation of Twitter’s Terms of Service. This link could lead to a site that:
  • steals your password or other personal information
  • installs malicious software programs on your computer
  • collects your personal information for spam purposes
  • has been associated with a violation of Twitter’s Terms of Service
Back to previous page

Sunday, September 18, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-14937907 TRY to catch a software bug before Tundra goes into mass production?

hiding a card...

F00956-ATX-14937907 doc that Toyota did not produce to U.S. govt, claiming it is irrelevant

source doc is somewhere in this group of 245 Japanese source docs
This document records an attempt to catch a potentially critical software bug in the cruise control that can lead to uncommanded acceleration, and the bug catching opportunity is immediately before mass production, which is too late. For every bug fixed, more are likely created.

This doc was shown on CNN, and Toyota vigorously denied that anything was wrong with the software. Its public statement [see text below] on that show, March 1, 2011, was almost surely misleading, and should be investigated as likely part of its cover-up of software defects.

Even if this defect was caught, it raises a large question about other defects that were not caught in time, as was admitted to by R&D chief Takimoto.

toyota defends itself laughably while attacking CNN

Saturday, September 17, 2016

doc HHAG0100008_0001 "Toyota doesn't [sic] lying, but it sounds like a lie"...really??

a layer cake.
a lawyer cake.
a liar cake.

bloody.

This is the doc in which appears a quote made famous by the U.S. DoJ, quoting Chris Tinto about "so many lies."

Not enough lies were uncovered.

HHAG0100008_0001 record of and commentary about 1/2010 NHTSA-Toyota meeting on UA

HHAG0100008_0001 Japanese source doc

Sunday, September 11, 2016

Toyota 4Runner accelerates off of parking garage; in cliff-hanger, driver is rescued from dangling vehicle



http://www.autoblog.com/2016/09/12/texas-man-drives-toyota-off-parking-structure/
http://kxan.com/2016/09/09/vehicle-dangles-from-parking-garage-in-downtown-austin/


Question: Why did Toyota not admit to the patterns it can obviously see in its internal databases of sudden acceleration incidents, i.e., many incidents of UA in parking lots that cannot be explained away by the flimsy excuse of 'pedal confusion?' Its Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. DoJ requires the company to proactively disclose safety issues.

Saturday, September 10, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-12376052 poor coordination of electrical design leads to vehicle problems in market

noise crusher needed.

F00956-ATX-12376052_T%20abnormal%20NE%20sensor%20output%20might%20affect%20driving%20controls.docx?dl=0

F00956-ATX-12376052 Japanese source document

Engineer, woe is me: "when was the A/C placed near the NE sensor?"

engineer describes himself as "victim."

Lexus driver charged in fatal crash pleads not guilty, blames Toyota


Lexus reflects engineering chaos


driver-pleads-not-guilty-in-hacienda-heights-crash-that-killed-young-couple/1505389/

"'We all want the truth to come out. This is going to be a third-party culpability case, and Toyota and Lexus, we plan on them being brought in and for the right outcome to happen for everybody,' [defense lawyer Louis] Shapiro said..."
"Shapiro said Kim's vehicle was defective and accelerated uncontrollably, causing the crash." 

Thursday, September 8, 2016

one answer about why toyota UA may happen



Someone who worked making IC chips at an Asian Tier 2 Toyota supplier (via Tier 1 Denso) said this;

"Our pay is $200/month. Our work schedule is four 12-hour days, then two days off. We inspect ICs manually or by microscope, and we are forced to work all night because the plant operates 24 hours a day. We fall asleep as we inspect. Even the supervisors fall asleep. If someone dies in a Toyota, they come and blame our ICs."





"Q: WHAT caused my 2013 Lexus RX450H to independently accelerate?"


Q: Car independently accelerated and
brake did not work - 2013 Lexus RX450H
asked by Stephane M on September 07, 2016
 
I was in a parking lot and backing out of the space. All the sudden and
without any warning, my car started independently accelerating and speeding
up; my brake would not work. Finally, I was able to stop the car by putting it
into Park. The stop was very abrupt and I didn’t even realize the sound was
my hitting something. This same thing happened about ½ a month ago, but
fortunately I did not hit anything that time. What is causing this trouble and
how do I find the solution?

https://www.yourmechanic.com/question/car-independently-accelerated-and-brake-did-not-work-2013-lexus-rx450h-by-stephane-miller

GREAT QUESTION.

Tuesday, September 6, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-15219508 FMEA failure modes during conversion to electronic throttle

Whoops dept.


F00956-ATX-15219508 list of system glitches, FMEA, during conversion to electronic throttle in 2001

F00956-ATX-15219508apanese source document

Years later, Toyota R&D chief Takimoto admitted in writing that not all possible failure modes were anticipated.

F00956-ATX-07050144 Takimoto admits

Japanese source doc

How can they have let this happen?  This is a damning indication of a systematic failure of their organization and management.  



Friday, September 2, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-15924189 Toyota engineer wonders what is displayed when mismatch between throttle position sensor, throttle position, and accelerator pedal


A mismatch.

F00956-ATX-15924189

F00956-ATX-15924189 Japanese source document

Note that this document directly calls into question the sworn testimony of Toyota executives, in particular Uchiyamada, before Congress...

There was indeed at least one UA incident caused by electrical/electronic components...but engineers could not understand what was happening.

"How is the failure mode displayed when there is a mismatch between the throttle position sensor * throttle position*accelerator sensor?
From the above situation,
Beyond the relationship between the accelerator, the throttle, (VSCTRC (throttle control and any causal relationship)) and the ECU, is there a need for reconsideration?
Because we don’t know, please look for the culprit once again.
I appreciate your cooperation, your understanding, and your consideration of the above matter.
End.

P.S.:
Mr. Taki of VEC
Please arrange the meeting attendance of individuals who understand and are responsible for communication related to the Century VSC, TRC control." 

Wednesday, August 31, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-07367831 a little truth pops out

doc F00956-ATX-18200932 Lexus engineers attempt to correct accelerator sensor non-linearity, consider grounding



F00956-ATX-18200932 fiddling around with different sizes of ground wires in Lexus

F00956-ATX-18200932 Japanese source document

Yesterday we held a meeting concerning grounding wire measures against performance changes. 
>
There is a change in the accelerator feel when the grounding wire is strengthened. > At such times, non-linearity and hiss [possibly “hysteresis”] were confirmed in relation to the actual accelerator stroke and accelerator sensor RAM value.
>
The aforementioned non-linearity sometimes occurs and sometimes does not occur, and the cause is unknown.
> The situation is that the effect on the engine is huge as long as any non-linearity remains, and we came to the conclusion that design changes in the grounding wire measures would be difficult in the current situation, due to engine emissions and other requirements.

>
> However, we are moving forward with analysis of the facts in the aforementioned sensor hiss and try to find out whether there is anything we can do.
> Therefore, would it be possible for you to move forward with consideration of conformance of drivability and riding comfort in terms of possibilities for both presence and absence of grounding wire measures. >

Toyota lawyer Christine Lofgren - a lady gladiator trying to enforce secrecy of Toyota internal documents that the public ought to see


Cutting away at free speech.

Facebook takes down content on the basis of any unsubstantiated claim of infringement; in contrast, other platforms tend to need court orders, AFAIK.

content of internal documents removed from Facebook at request of Toyota lawyer Christine Lofgren

Tuesday, August 30, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-12884974 electrical load problems causing "ghosts" --unpredictable vehicle behavior in many models

F00956-ATX-12884974

F00956-ATX-12884974 Japanese source text

最近では装備の少ない、120L,130L,045Lもお化けが
> 発生しており、心配です。

"Even in lightly-loaded models 120L, 130L, and 045L, ghosts have occurred recently, and we are worried."































doc F00956-ATX-12438165 Toyota engineer to Denso re: gas pedal abnormal sensor fixit meeting


Shimizu 12/07 [forwarded to several Denso employees after being distributed to many Toyota engineers] : “Subject: Accelerator sensor error  Regular progress report meeting” 

This time, for once at least, sincerely investigate FTA [field technical issues] …If you always say foreign matter is at fault…I smell a rat.” 
 
"one more thing--I ask that you separate the causes between the accelerator pedal and the ECU, and that you verify your predictions of future occurences."

F00956-ATX-12438165

F00956-ATX-12438165 source document in Japanese

Monday, August 29, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-15925054 electronics causes admission by Toyota engineers

Some parts.

"The large number of market malfunctions of the accelerator pedal sensor linkage were confirmed. According to the explanation of the Electrical Engineering Dept, it was concluded that the problem lay exclusively with Electrical Engineering Department components (ECM connectors, accelerator sensors and software related.)" 


F00956-ATX-15925054 source document in Japanese

Monday, August 22, 2016

Korean study demonstrates 100% wide open throttle SUA reproduced by auto voltage drop

A very odd couple: Gas pedal, 35%, throttle valve 100%

 S. Park, Y. Choi, W. Choi, Experimental Study for the Reproduction of Sudden Unintended Acceleration Incidents, Forensic Science International (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2016.08.014

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0379073816303449
Abstract
A few cases of the sudden unintended acceleration have been reported over the last few years 0005, 0010, 0015, 0020, 0025, 0030, 0035, 0040, 0045, 0050 and 0055 and some of them seemed to be somewhat related to an electronic throttle control (ETC) system 0055 and 0060. In this experimental study, efforts were made to reproduce the cases of sudden unintended acceleration possibly related to the ETC. Typically, an ETC of the engine is managed based on signals from airflow sensor, throttle position sensor and acceleration pedal sensor. With this typical sensor configurations in mind, these sensor signals were checked for noise levels. However, none of them showed any clear relationship with the sudden unintended acceleration mainly due to the robustness of the ETC logic software. As an alternative approach, supply voltage to an engine control unit (ECU) was tempered intentionally to observe any clues for the incidents. The observed results with the supply voltage drop and fluctuation tests were rather astonishing. The throttle valve position went all the way up to 100% for around one second when the battery voltage plunged down to 7 V periodically despite that the acceleration pedal position was kept steady. As an effort to confirm the case, multiple tries were made systematically on a chassis dynamometer as well as on the test road. In this paper, detailed procedures and findings are reported accordingly.

Question: The authors point to vehicles overloaded with power-hungry electrical devices as a likely cause of low voltages and SUA. In at least a dozen documents, including one that I posted here a few days ago, Toyota engineers expressed concerns that vehicles were behaving unpredictably due to issues with electrical loads. What is the connection?

Monday, August 15, 2016

Repost of Michael Barr's Bookout victory comments


Well-encrusted, but far too ornate and heavy


Here below is a frank blog post by Michael Barr, the leader of the embedded systems experts who examined Toyota's source code under conditions of tight security imposed by Toyota to protect the secrecy of the software it called its "Crown Jewel."
After Barr gave expert testimony that Toyota's ETC failsafe was like a "house of cards," I think Toyota has ceased describing its software with those words. Not a queen of diamonds there.

Barr's concerns about the source code's poor quality echo those of the Toyota engineers, as they wrote in the documents.  Here is Barr's blog post:

An Update on Toyota and Unintended Acceleration
Saturday, October 26th, 2013 by Michael Barr
http://embeddedgurus.com/barr-code/2013/10/an-update-on-toyota-and-unintended-acceleration/
(downloaded on 29 October 2013)
Michael Barr
Michael Barr is an expert on the design of software-powered medical
devices and other embedded computer systems. (full bio)

In early 2011, I wrote a couple of blog posts (here and here) as well as a later article
(here) describing my initial thoughts on skimming NASAs official report on its
analysis of Toyotas electronic throttle control system. Half a year later, I was
contacted and retained by attorneys for numerous parties involved in
suing Toyota for personal injuries and economic losses stemming from incidents of
unintended acceleration. As a result, I got to look at Toyotas engine source code
directly and judge for myself.
From January 2012, Ive led a team of seven experienced engineers, including three
others from Barr Group, in reviewing Toyotas electronic throttle and some other
source code as well as related documents, in a secure room near my home in
Maryland. This work proceeded in two rounds, with a first round of expert reports and
depositions issued in Summer 2012 that led to a billion-dollar economic loss
settlement as well as an undisclosed settlement of the first personal injury case set
for trial in U.S. Federal Court. The second round began with an over 800 page formal
written expert report by me in April 2013 and culminated this week in an Oklahoma
jurys decision that the multiple defects in Toyotas engine software directly caused a
September 2007 single vehicle crash that injured the driver and killed her passenger.
Dont be misled by much of the mainstream coverage of the Oklahoma verdict. While
it is true this was the first time Toyota has lost an unintended acceleration case in
court, it is more significant that this was the first and only jury so far to hear any
opinions about Toyotas software defects. Each of the earlier cases either predated
our source code access, applied a non-software theory, or was settled by Toyota for
an undisclosed sum.
In our analysis of Toyotas source code, we built upon the work that NASA had done.
First, we looked more closely at more lines of the source code for more vehicles for
more man months. And we also did a lot of things that NASA didnt have time to do,
including reviewing Toyotas operating systems internals, reviewing the source code
for Toyotas monitor CPU (which even Toyota hadnt ever done before! (!)),
performing an independent worst-case stack depth analysis, running portions of the
main CPU software including the RTOS in a processor simulator, and
demonstratingin exemplar Toyota Camry vehiclesa link between loss of throttle
control and the numerous defects we found in the software.
In a nutshell, the team led by Barr Group found what the NASA team sought but
couldnt find: a systematic software malfunction in the Main CPU that opens the
throttle without operator action and continues to properly control fuel injection and
ignition that is not reliably detected by any fail-safe. To be clear, NASA never
concluded software wasnt at least one of the causes of Toyotas high complaint rate
for unintended acceleration; they just said they werent able to find the specific
software defect(s) that caused unintended acceleration. We did.
Now its your turn to judge for yourself. Though I dont think you can find my 800
page expert report outside the Court system, heres the trial transcript [*] of my expert
testimony to the Oklahoma jury in Bookout, et.al. v. Toyota.
Note that the jury in Oklahoma went with the software defects and found that Toyota
owed each victim $1.5 million in compensatory damages and also found reckless
disregard. The latter legal standard meant the jury was headed toward deliberations
on additional punitive damages when Toyota finally called the plaintiffs to settle (for
yet another undisclosed amount). I understand there are about 500 personal injury
cases still working their way through various courts, including one set for trial in
November in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana, California.
***********************************************************
2 Responses to An Update on Toyota and Unintended Acceleration
1. Miro Samek says:
October 28, 2013 at 4:49 pm
Hi Michael,
Thank you for posting the link to your court deposition. I found it fascinating
and couldnt stop reading late into the night
There is no doubt in my mind that exposing the inadequacies in the Toyota
firmware is a very important development for the whole embedded software
profession.
It is also interesting to see old mistakes repeated time and time again. For
example a timed task degenerating into a kitchen sink.
I also bet my shirt that there were no assertions in the Toyota firmware.
Assertions in software work like fuses in electrical systems and beyond
certain density of assertions in the code all failures (including hardware
failures) manifest themselves as assertion violations. Im sure that this could
have saved the day (besides making software development so much faster).
Anyway, there are tons of valuable lessons to learn here. From now on I will
imagine that all my software is on trial
Miro
2. David W. Gilbert, Ph.D. says:
October 28, 2013 at 10:25 pm
Dear Mr. Barr,
Nicely done! I found your testimony very interesting, and while I am not a
software expert, I can certainly verify the inability of Toyota vehicles to detect
certain malfunctions in the electronic throttle controls. And few malfunctions
are more apparent than tin whiskers growing inside the APP sensors!
Since my 2010 testimony in the Washington Toyota hearings, I have learned
much. Your testimony certainly adds to that knowledge and I am pleased that
it has received much needed media attention.
Maybe our paths will cross someday.
DWG
***************************************************
[*] Trial transcript is available on the Safety Research & Strategies website

Sunday, July 24, 2016

doc F00956-ATX-12884994 Many engineers trying to diagnose inrush current causes voltage drop, vehicle behavior

This is Koji Kato of 11G.

In regard to NV [Noise and Vibration],
at the moment there is no function change for the function of concern. In the future, I will ask about the 250L status and check it carefully.

Atsushi Nomura wrote:

>This is Nomura of ZJ.
>
> As Mr.Takagi has stated below,
in regard to performance changes that are being confirmed now regarding NV (idle vibration is okay, right?) as well as 200L functional stability/driveability, please let us now the concrete details and occurrence conditions.
>
>
Yesterday I asked ST Takagi of 1ET about the situation with each vehicle. He indicated the
> 200L (180L) must also be handled with quite a bit of concern.
 >
> For example,
it seems we had better deal first and frankly with phenomena that have causes that are not well understood, such as the loss of steering power when the engine is at high RPMs (the cause is unknown, but still...).
>
>
Strange phenomenon may also happen when an inrush current causes a voltage drop at a time when the engine has a large load (A/C ON & PS ON, etc.).
Actually,
abnormal phenomena also seem to be happening in the 250L during sudden steering (EPS) and when the ABS operates. Additionally, the large variations of electrical load in the new 250L V8s seem to be causing problems of large idling vibrations.
>
> As I’ve requested, please borrow a 180L electronic AS vehiclefull specand urgently confirm whether or not any unexpected phenomena are present. Recently, such unexpected phenomena have also appeared in the 120L, 130L and 045L, which have only a small amount of equipment, which worries me.
>
Regards
> --
> The contents of this e-mail or its attachments may include confidential information. Please take due care in its handling, and avoid forwarding
.
> Confidential information may be contained in the e-mail text
> and/or attachment.
> Please handle these carefully and refrain from
forwarding to
> unauthorized people.
> *************************************************************
> Atsushi Nomura
> Assistant Chief Engineer
> ZJ2, PRODUCT PLANNING DIV., TOYOTA DEVELOPMENT CENTER 1
> PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT GROUP, TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
> Phone:+81-565-72-2558 FAX:+81-565-72-2339
> mailto:nomura@giga.tec.toyota.co.jp
> *************************************************************
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Subject: Proposed departments to include in group of departments related to handling  vehicle performance changes

> Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2005 09:49:28 +0900
> From: Masashi
Takagi<takagima@mail.tec.toyota.co.jp>
> To: nomura@giga.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
> Hello, this is Takagi from 1ET
.
>
> It depends on what we’ll do, but assuming we will decide the first step is dealing with software versions, the systems departments
within the C, E, V and H divisions that relate to motion  performance, as well as the PF group and communication group should be included, so in concrete terms wouldn’t they be as follows?

> ZJ2
 15G FK VLC 22H 42H 1CK 2CK 1SE SGE 1AV VK 4PH GH
>
> Secondly, I
think we must add light-related (AFS, etc.) and air conditioning related individuals in order to confirm power consumption issues.
>
> Still, what will we be confirming practically speaking in terms of the 200L?
We don’t understand the condition that well, so the phenomenon and the conditions of its occurrence should firstly be clarified by 15G.
> I realize it’s not possible to quantify the phenomenon, so
functional items are fine, but the conditions at the time are important.
>
>I have attached for
your reference a list of the individuals who were sent invitations to the meeting about the 215L.
>
>
#1 Toyota Centre ZJZJ1 Katsunori Makibayashi 2-2553 mailto:katunori@makibayashi.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Operation Function Development Dept. Vehicle Operation 2G Ken Mori  816-7611 mailto:ken@mori.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Vehicle Engineering Division Vehicle Control System Development Dept. Suspense Integration Control G Osamu Yasuike 816-7692 mailto:osamu@yasuike.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Vehicle Engineering Division Vehicle Control Systems Development Dept. Suspension Integration Control G Atsushi Mizuta 816-2711 mailto:mizuta@atsushi.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Vehicle Engineering Division Chassis Development Dept. Absorber Control Development G Hideki Ohashi 2-5638 mailto:hideki@ohashi.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Vehicle Electronic Design Division #2 Vehicle Electronic Design Dept. #1G Keita Omi 2-3981 mailto:ohmik@nano.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Lexus Chassis Design Division Lexus Control System Design Dept. VSC Control 3G Zensaku Murakami 2-2146 mailto:zensaku@murakami.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division Project Development Progress 1G Makoto Uno 2-3537 mailto:makoto@uno.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Electronics Engineering Division #1 2 Electronics Dept. Junzo Ooe 2-6209 mailto:ooe@junzo.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division Project Development Progress 1G Kazuo Asano 2-3538 mailto:kaz@asano.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Lexus Chassis Design Division Lexus  Control System Design Dept. VSC Control 3G Hiroaki Yoshida 2-5207 mailto:hiroaki@yoshida.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Drive Train Engineering Division #3 AT Engineering Dept. #3 3G Hayata Kondo 2-8776 mailto:hayata@nano.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Lexus  Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Lexus  Function Development Dept. Operation Control G Yuichi Toyoda 816-2420 mailto:yuichi@toyoda.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Vehicle Electronic Design Division Vehicle Electronic Planning Dept. #5G Takashi Yanagisawa 2-3892 mailto:takashi@yanagisawa.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Vehicle Engineering Division Vehicle Control System Development Dept. Stair Integration Control G Kenji Shibata 816-2713 mailto:kenji@shibata.tec.toyota.co.jp
>Engine
Project Progress Division #65G Takanobu Noda 2-7568 mailto:takanobu@noda.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Integration System Development Division #1 Development Dept. #2G Masashi Takagi 2-6538 mailto:takagima@mail.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Participants (Attendance optional)
>
#2 Vehicle Engineering Division Chassis Development Dept. Absorber Control Development G Masaaki Tabata 2-5635 mailto:tabata@masa.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Operation Function Development Dept.  Ikutomo Sakai 816-7590 mailto:sakai@ikutomo.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Vehicle Electronic Design Division #1 Vehicle Electronics Design Dept.  Tomoaki Katayama 2-4004 mailto:katayama@tomoaki.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Vehicle Electronic Design Division #2 Vehicle Electronic Design Dept. #1G Masahiro Kando 2-3944 mailto:masa@kando.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Vehicle Electronic Design Division Vehicle Electronic Planning Dept.#3G Hiroya Andoh 2-3897 mailto:hiroya@andoh.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Operation Function Development Dept. #5 2 Test Team lead Masahiro Matsumoto 816-7642 mailto:masahiro@matumoto.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Vehicle Engineering Division Vehicle Control System Development Dept. Stair Integration Control G Takahiro Kojo 816-2744 mailto:t.kojo@mail.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Operation Function Development Dept.  Takanori Ishizu 816-7601 mailto:ishizu@taka.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Lexus Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Lexus Function Development Dept. Operation Control G Hideyuki Aizawa 816-7641 mailto:aizawa@hideyuki.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
Lexus  Chassis Design Division Lexus  Control System Design Dept.  Masayuki Soga 2-2140 mailto:masayuki@soga.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#2 Drive Train Engineering Division #3 AT Engineering Dept. # 3 G Hiroyuki Ishii 2-8785 mailto:ishii@hiroyuki.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Merchantability Development Dept. Project Development Progress Test Team lead #2 Takanobu Fukuoka 2-3698 mailto:taka@fukuoka.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Merchantability Development Dept. Project Development Progress Test Team lead #2 Taro Yamada 2-3736 mailto:taro@yamada.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
#1 Vehicle EngineeringDivision Test Section #3 Test Team lead Mitsuhiro Kubota 816-7679 mailto:kubota@json.tec.toyota.co.jp
>Engine 
Project Progress Division #65 G Toshio Yoshidome 2-7565 mailto:tommy@yosidome.tec.toyota.co.jp
>
>
Regards

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Toyota Motor Corporation
  #Vehicle Function Development Division #1 Vibration Noise Development Dept.
  Koji Kato
  E-Mail koji@kato.tec.toyota.co.jp   
  Tel.  0565-72-3573
  FAX   0565-72-3517  
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